On February 9th, 2026, between 09:16 UTC and 15:12 UTC GitHub Actions customers experienced run start delays. Approximately 0.6% of runs across 1.8% of repos were affected, with an average delay of 19 minutes for those delayed runs.The incident occurred when increased load exposed a bottleneck in our event publishing system, causing one compute node to fall behind on processing Actions Jobs. We mitigated by rebalancing traffic and increasing timeouts for event processing. We have since isolated performance critical events to a new, dedicated publisher to prevent contention between events and added safeguards to better tolerate processing timeouts.
On February 9, 2026, between ~06:00 UTC and ~12:12 UTC, Copilot Coding Agent and related Copilot API endpoints experienced degraded availability. The primary impact was to agent-based workflows (requests to /agents/swe/*, including custom agent configuration checks), where 154k users saw failed requests and error responses in their editor/agent experience. Impact was concentrated among users and integrations actively using Copilot Coding Agent with VS Code. The degradation was caused by an unexpected surge in traffic to the related API endpoints that exceeded an internal secondary rate limit. That resulted in upstream request denials which were surfaced to users as elevated 500 errors.We mitigated the incident by deploying a change that increased the applicable rate limit for this traffic, which allowed requests to complete successfully and returned the service to normal operation.After the mitigation, we deployed guardrails with applicable caching to avoid a repeat of similar incidents. We also temporarily increased infrastructure capacity to better handle backlog recovery from the rate limiting. We're are improving monitoring around growing agentic API endpoints.
On February 9, 2026, between 07:05 UTC and 11:26 UTC, GitHub experienced intermittent degradation across Issues, Pull Requests, Webhooks, Actions, and Git operations. Approximately every 30 minutes, users encountered brief periods of elevated errors and timeouts lasting roughly 15 seconds each. During the incident window, approximately 1–2% of requests were impacted across these services, with Git operations experiencing up to 7% error rates during individual spikes. GitHub Actions saw up to 2% of workflow runs delayed by a median of approximately 7 minutes due to backups created during these periods. This was due to multiple resource-intensive workloads running simultaneously, which caused intermittent processing delays on the data storage layer. We mitigated the incident by scaling storage to a larger compute capacity, which resolved the processing delays. We are working to improve detection of resource-intensive queries, identify changes in load patterns, and enhance our monitoring to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of issues like this one in the future.
On February 6, 2026, between 17:49 UTC and 18:36 UTC, the GitHub Mobile service was degraded, and some users were unable to create pull request review comments on deleted lines (and in some cases, comments on deleted files). This impacted users on the newer comment-positioning flow available in version 1.244.0 of the mobile apps. Telemetry indicated that the failures increased as the Android rollout progressed. This was due to a defect in the new comment-positioning workflow that could result in the server rejecting comment creation for certain deleted-line positions.We mitigated the incident by halting the Android rollout and implementing interim client-side fallback behavior while a platform fix is in progress. The client-side fallback is scheduled to be published early this week. We are working to (1) add clearer client-side error handling (avoid infinite spinners), (2) improve monitoring/alerting for these failures, and (3) adopt stable diff identifiers for diff-based operations to reduce the likelihood of recurrence.
On February 10, 2026, between 10:28 and 11:54 UTC, Visual Studio Code users experienced a degraded experience on GitHub Copilot when using the Claude Opus 4.6 model. During this time, approximately 50% of users encountered agent turn failures due to the model being unable to serve the volume of incoming requests.Rate limits set too low for actual demand caused the issue. While the initial deployment showed no concerns, a surge in traffic from Europe on the following day caused VSCode to begin hitting rate limit errors. Additionally, a degradation message intended to notify users of high usage failed to trigger due to a misconfiguration. We mitigated the incident by adjusting rate limits for the model.We improved our rate limiting to prevent future models from experiencing similar issues. We are also improving our capacity planning processes to reduce the risk of similar incidents in the future, and enhancing our detection and mitigation capabilities to reduce impact to customers.
On February 3, 2026, between 14:00 UTC and 17:40 UTC, customers experienced delays in Webhook delivery for push events and delayed GitHub Actions workflow runs. During this window, Webhook deliveries for push events were delayed by up to 40 minutes, with an average delay of 10 minutes. GitHub Actions workflows triggered by push events experienced similar job start delays. Additionally, between 15:25 UTC and 16:05 UTC, all GitHub Actions workflow runs experienced status update delays of up to 11 minutes, with a median delay of 6 minutes.The issue stemmed from connection churn in our eventing service, which caused CPU saturation and delays for reads and writes, with subsequent downstream delivery delays for Actions and Webhooks. We have added observability tooling and metrics to accelerate detection, and are correcting stream processing client configuration to prevent recurrence.
On February 3, 2026, between 09:35 UTC and 10:15 UTC, GitHub Copilot experienced elevated error rates, with an average of 4% of requests failing.This was caused by a capacity imbalance that led to resource exhaustion on backend services. The incident was resolved by infrastructure rebalancing, and we subsequently deployed additional capacity.We are improving observability to detect capacity imbalances earlier and enhancing our infrastructure to better handle traffic spikes.
On February 2, 2026, GitHub Codespaces were unavailable between 18:55 and 22:20 UTC and degraded until the service fully recovered at February 3, 2026 00:15 UTC. During this time, Codespaces creation and resume operations failed in all regions. This outage was caused by a backend storage access policy change in our underlying compute provider that blocked access to critical VM metadata, causing all VM create, delete, reimage, and other operations to fail. More information is available at https://azure.status.microsoft/en-us/status/history/?trackingId=FNJ8-VQZ. This was mitigated by rolling back the policy change, which started at 22:15 UTC. As VMs came back online, our runners worked through the backlog of requests that hadn’t timed out. We are working with our compute provider to improve our incident response and engagement time, improve early detection before they impact our customers, and ensure safe rollout should similar changes occur in the future. We recognize this was a significant outage to our users that rely on GitHub’s workloads and apologize for the impact this had.
On February 2, 2026, between 18:35 UTC and 22:15 UTC, GitHub Actions hosted runners were unavailable, with service degraded until full recovery at 23:10 UTC for standard runners and at February 3, 2026 00:30 UTC for larger runners. During this time, Actions jobs queued and timed out while waiting to acquire a hosted runner. Other GitHub features that leverage this compute infrastructure were similarly impacted, including Copilot Coding Agent, Copilot Code Review, CodeQL, Dependabot, GitHub Enterprise Importer, and Pages. All regions and runner types were impacted. Self-hosted runners on other providers were not impacted. This outage was caused by a backend storage access policy change in our underlying compute provider that blocked access to critical VM metadata, causing all VM create, delete, reimage, and other operations to fail. More information is available at https://azure.status.microsoft/en-us/status/history/?trackingId=FNJ8-VQZ. This was mitigated by rolling back the policy change, which started at 22:15 UTC. As VMs came back online, our runners worked through the backlog of requests that hadn’t timed out. We are working with our compute provider to improve our incident response and engagement time, improve early detection before they impact our customers, and ensure safe rollout should similar changes occur in the future. We recognize this was a significant outage to our users that rely on GitHub’s workloads and apologize for the impact this had.
From Jan 31, 2026 00:30 UTC to Feb 2, 2026 18:00 UTC Dependabot service was degraded and failed to create 10% of Automated Pull Requests. This was due to a cluster failover that connected to a read-only database.We mitigated the incident by pausing Dependabot queues until traffic was properly routed to healthy clusters. We’re working on identifying and rerunning all failed jobs during this time.We’re adding new monitors and alerts to reduce our time to detection and prevent this in the future.