Incident History

This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.

From June 26, 2026 at 23:40 UTC through June 28, 2026 at 20:55 UTC, Copilot Cloud Agent was degraded. The agent could fail when reporting progress, replying to pull request comments, or opening pull requests. For affected built-in tool calls, the average error rate was approximately 8%, with hourly error rates peaking around 26%.This was due to a regression introduced during a Copilot Cloud Agent runtime deployment that caused several built-in agent tools to become unavailable. In many cases, the affected tool calls failed silently so agent jobs appeared to succeed. This monitoring gap meant it took longer than expected to identify the failure. We mitigated the incident by reverting the runtime deployment to the previously stable version.We've added monitoring and alerting for this class of tool-availability error to reduce time-to-detection. We're also adding regression tests for these built-in agent tools, and improving the shipping safety for future runtime rollouts to avoid similar issues.

This incident was used to notify for a maintenance event. There is no specific root cause analysis. Work progressed as planned without any issues to report.

On June 25, 2026, between 17:33 UTC and 17:55 UTC, our background job service experienced degradation which increased delays to pull requests, repository pushes, Actions workflows, and Webhooks, with delays peaking at 7m. The issue was caused by underlying hypervisor issues and an incoming traffic spike, causing service timeouts which led to a connection storm and continual rebalances. The issue was mitigated by replacing the problem node at 17:49, after which all services saw recovery by 18:07.

On June 23, 2026, between 22:45 and 23:29 UTC, GitHub Copilot Completions and Next Edit Suggestions were degraded for users in all regions. During this window, affected users may have seen failed or missing code completions and Next Edit Suggestions. On average about 25% of Completions and Next Edit Suggestions requests failed during the impact window, peaking at roughly 27%. The cause was a configuration change that prevented the Copilot service from obtaining the authentication tokens it needs to reach its model backends; this both failed requests directly and caused the service to temporarily remove backends from rotation. GitHub engineers detected the elevated error rate within minutes, declared an incident, and mitigated the issue at 23:22 UTC by redeploying the service with a known-good configuration, which restored normal operation. As a follow-up, the team disabled the affected authentication path to prevent a future deployment from re-introducing the problem, and is making the change rollout safer. We apologize for the disruption and are taking steps to reduce the likelihood of similar incidents.

On June 17, 2026, between 11:35 UTC and 19:20 UTC, the Webhooks service was degraded and delivered webhook payloads with missing installation information. On average, 11.3% of webhook deliveries were impacted. Customers relying on the installation field for authentication or routing were unable to process affected webhooks. A smaller subset of deliveries for the security_advisory event (0.04%) were delivered successfully but were not recorded for redelivery. This was due to a defect in a new delivery code path that failed to include installation data in webhook payloads.

We mitigated the incident by disabling the feature flag controlling the new code path.

We are working to improve our automated validation of webhook payloads, and introduce automated alerting for webhook payload regressions to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of issues like this one in the future.

The following events were affected: branch_protection_configuration, code_scanning_alert, commit_comment, custom_property, custom_property_values, dependabot_alert, deploy_key, deployment_protection_rule, deployment_review, dismissal_request_code_scanning, dismissal_request_secret_scanning, installation_target, member, membership, merge_queue_entry, org_block, organization, projects_v2, projects_v2_item, pull_request_review_thread, repository_ruleset, secret_scanning_alert, secret_scanning_alert_location, secret_scanning_scan, security_and_analysis, star, sub_issues, team, team_add, workflow_job.

On June 17, 2026, between 16:57 UTC and 19:14 UTC, Copilot code completions were degraded and users were unable to receive Next Edit Suggestions. Standard ghost text code completions were not affected. This was due to a configuration change that caused the service's routing layer to incorrectly discard all Next Edit Suggestion model endpoints as invalid.We mitigated the incident by deploying a corrected configuration change at 18:55 UTC, with full recovery observed at 19:14 UTC.We are working to improve the resilience of our routing layer to limit impact due to a subset of invalid configurations, and to improve our alerting to detect sudden traffic changes that are not captured by standard error rate monitors.

On June 17, 2026, between approximately 03:35 UTC and 04:44 UTC, GitHub Copilot was degraded and most of its frontier chat models were temporarily unavailable across all regions. During this window, affected models either disappeared from the model picker in the web, editor, and CLI experiences, or returned a "model not available" error when selected. Customers could continue using GitHub Copilot by selecting one of the models that remained available. The incident occurred during off-peak hours, which limited the number of customers affected.This was due to a configuration change that our production system deemed invalid. We mitigated the incident by reverting the configuration change, after which the affected models returned automatically as the service reloaded the previous configuration.We are working to roll out configuration changes gradually with stronger validations, alerts on sudden drops in the number of available models, and automatically rolls back configuration changes that produce these alerts.